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We draw on stylized facts from the ﬁnance literature to build a model where altering the
relative costs of bank and bond ﬁnancing changes the entire distribution of ﬁrm size, with
implications for the aggregate capital stock, output, and welfare. Reducing transactions costs
in the bond market increases the output and proﬁts of mid-sized ﬁrms at the expense of both
the largest and smallest ﬁrms. In contrast, reducing the frictions involved in bank lending
promotes the expansion of the smallest ﬁrms while all other ﬁrms shrink, even as it increases
the proﬁtability of both small and mid-size ﬁrms. Although both policies increase aggregate
output and welfare, they have opposite eﬀects on the extensive margin of production—promoting
bond issuance causes exit while cheaper bank credit induces entry. When reducing transactions
costs in one market, the resulting increase in output and welfare are largest when transactions
costs in the other market are very high.
1 Introduction
While it is widely accepted that bank and bond market development aﬀect small ﬁrms diﬀerently,
it is not clear how altering the relative costs between diﬀerent ﬁnancial instruments aﬀects the
allocation of capital and output across ﬁrms in general equilibrium. As Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt,
Laeven, and Levine (2008) write, “theory stresses the link between ﬁnancial market imperfections
and small ﬁrms, not necessarily the link between ﬁnance and [the] entire distribution of ﬁrm sizes
in an economy.” We model how the choice between bank and bond ﬁnancing inﬂuences the capital
stock, aggregate output, and welfare through the channel of intra-industry reallocation. We ﬁnd
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1that looking at the entire distribution of ﬁrm sizes is key to assessing the macroeconomic impacts
of developing speciﬁc types of ﬁnancial markets and its eﬀect on ﬁrm behavior.
We study the interaction between ﬁrm ﬁnancial choice and production using a closed-economy
version of a Melitz (2003)/Ghironi and Melitz (2005) model with ﬁrm heterogeneity, innovating
within this framework by introducing capital investment and two distinct ﬁnancial markets. By
assumption, ﬁrms must borrow from ﬁnancial intermediaries to purchase capital for production.
There are two types of contracts available to the ﬁrms, intermediated bank loans and public bonds.
Bond issuance involves a higher ﬁxed cost than bank loans, which limits access to ﬁrms with large
sales revenues. The bond yield and interest rate on bank loans are each the result of a costly
state veriﬁcation problem as in Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001). As public debt issues are commonly
referred to as “unmonitored” lending, we assume the monitoring cost is lower for bond investors
than for bank lenders. Firms ﬁnd it harder to access the public bond market due to the higher
ﬁxed cost; however, in our model, these ﬁxed costs reduce the cost of monitoring ﬁrms in the event
of default, so the marginal cost of ﬁnancing capital with bond issues is cheaper than with bank
loans—the bond yield is lower than the bank interest rate.
In contrast to studies arguing that ﬁnancial development favors small ﬁrms, our ﬁndings indicate
that the impacts of policy targeted at one market or the other are much more nuanced. For
instance, reducing the spread between the interest rates on bank loans and bank deposits by
lowering monitoring costs or through other means, including direct subsidies,1 increases the size and
the number of small ﬁrms operating in our model (the extensive margin), as they depend on bank
credit for capital ﬁnancing. Mid-sized ﬁrms induced to switch to bank credit from bond issuance
shrink in size. These mid-sized ﬁrms enjoy lower ﬁxed costs of ﬁnancing when switching to bank
credit, but pass their increased marginal costs of ﬁnancing on to consumers in the form of higher
prices. The largest ﬁrms, bond issuers who continue to issue bonds, also shrink a bit as small ﬁrms
pass savings in the costs of bank ﬁnancing to consumers in the form of lower prices and steal away
bits of the largest ﬁrms’ market share. The net eﬀect, due to the expansion of incumbent bank
borrowers, is growth in the intensive margin of production for the average ﬁrm.
The real wage increases when incumbent bank borrowers lower their prices and expand their
1Alternatively, increased competition (contestability) in the banking sector might reduce lending to deposit rate
spreads, which would have an equivalent eﬀect in our stylized framework. See Claessens and Laeven (2004) for
empirical evidence and de Blas and Russ (2009) for a theoretical model of contestability and spreads.
2output. Notably, this increase in labor costs diminishes the proﬁts of the largest ﬁrms, including
some of the mid-sized ﬁrms that switch to bank ﬁnancing. Further, despite the switching of
some ﬁrms from bond issues to bank credit when bank monitoring costs fall, the increase in the
relative cost of labor among bond issuers actually increases total bond issuance, as these large ﬁrms
substitute capital for labor. This second-order complementarity generates a “co-evolution in banks
and [bond] markets,” described by Levine (2005) as an important feature of ﬁnancial development.
This co-evolution breaks down when ﬁnancial policy targets transactions costs in the bond
market. In our model, policies that reduce the ﬁxed cost of bond issuance, like policies that reduce
bank monitoring costs, have a positive aggregate impact, increasing the overall capital stock, output,
and welfare. However, reducing bond issuance costs squeezes the extensive margin of production.
As the bond issuance cost falls, mid-sized ﬁrms switch from bank to bond issues. These switching
ﬁrms beneﬁt from a reduction in marginal costs as bond issuance is cheaper, on the margin, than
bank borrowing, which allows them to lower their prices and spurs them to increase output, driving
up the real wage. Incumbent bank borrowers both lose market share to the price-cutting switchers
and struggle with higher labor costs, forcing some to exit and survivors to shrink. As with the
bank-promoting policy, a reduction in bond issuance costs also increases the intensive margin of
production for the average ﬁrm. However, in this case, the cheaper prices charged by these switching
mid-sized ﬁrms usurps market share from the largest ﬁrms that did not switch from bank borrowing
to bond issuance. These large ﬁrms reduce their output, just like the surviving bank borrowers.
New bond issues by the switchers outweigh cutbacks by incumbent bond issuers, so total bond
issues increase, even as the banking sector contracts.
Government policies play an important role in determining the ﬁxed issuance costs and the
monitoring costs that we model. The improvement of institutions such as bankruptcy courts and
contract enforcement reduces the burden of monitoring costs for banks, improving their eﬃciency
as intermediaries and potentially lowering their interest rates on loans. Endo (2008) ﬁnds that
government policies can also pose substantial barriers to entry into the bond market. Our model
suggests that the gains from policies targeted at reducing any transactions costs like these depend
on the level of transactions costs in other sectors of the ﬁnancial market. The relative gains from
bond development are largest when the interest rates on bank loans are high, as bond sector
development helps circumvent the distortions caused by bank ineﬃciency. Similarly, the gains from
3banking sector development are also the greatest when the ﬁxed cost involved in bond issuance is
high. Thus, the eﬀect of any policy aimed at ﬁnancial development depends on the full menu of
ﬁnancial choices available to ﬁrms.
1.1 Key assumptions and empirical evidence
We are agnostic as to which types of institutions might be best overall for ﬁnancial development,
growth and welfare.2 Instead, we asses the interaction between the most basic features of domestic
banking and bond markets and their implications for the distribution of ﬁrm size and economic
welfare. To this end, we present empirical support for our key assumptions—a higher ﬁxed cost
and lower marginal cost for bond versus bank ﬁnancing.
We assume that there is a sizeable ﬁxed cost involved in public issues of corporate bonds, which
results in large ﬁrms issuing bonds in public debt markets and smaller ﬁrms using bank loans for
credit. Krishnaswami, Spindt, and Subramaniam (1999) ﬁnd that all but the largest U.S. ﬁrms
are shut out of public debt markets by large issuance costs. Zervos (2004) calculates that costs of
issuing domestic corporate debt range between 2% and 4.8% of the size of issues in Latin America.
Data on ﬁxed fees associated with bank loans are sparse, but a survey of loan and issuance fees
discussed in our Calibration section suggests that they are about half the size of those associated
with primary bond issues in the United States. A novel survey by Leal and Carvalho-da Silva (2006)
of 357 ﬁrms listed on the Brazilian stock exchange reveals that high issuance costs are the number
one impediment to bond issuance, with underwriting fees, credit rating agencies’ fees, lawyers’ fees,
registration fees, and disclosure requirements cited as signiﬁcant obstacles to issuance by 23–43%
of ﬁrms surveyed.3 Hale and Santos (2008) present evidence that the large ﬁxed cost involved in
ﬂoating public bonds for the ﬁrst time is likely to be a mechanism to help overcome information
asymmetries, as issuing public debt lowers the spreads ﬁrms pay in other credit markets. They
also note that more than 80% of ﬁrms that issue public debt had no oﬃcial credit rating until
the time of the issue. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that ﬁxed costs of bond issuance are large
and associated with a low monitoring cost for bondholders, which is the parameter representing
2A vast body of work reviews the role that ﬁnancial development has on growth. This literature has been surveyed
extensively by Levine (1997, 2005). Levine (2005) points out that the structure of the ﬁnancial system (bank-based
versus market-based) is not a good predictor of ﬁnancial development as measured by overall access to and levels of
private credit. See Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002) for detailed discussion of this ﬁnding.
3See Appendix 2, question d on p.75 in Leal and Carvalho-da Silva (2006) for these ﬁndings.
4information asymmetries in our model.
Large ﬁxed costs in our model mean that only the largest, most proﬁtable ﬁrms issue bonds.
Mizen and Tsoukas (2008) show that bond issuers are approximately 10–15% larger than non-issuers
in Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand, though their evidence associating issuance with
proﬁtability is mixed. Denis and Mihov (2003) demonstrate that borrowers in U.S. public debt
markets are larger, more proﬁtable, and have higher credit ratings, while smaller ﬁrms use banks
or privately placed debt. Both Houston and James (1996) and Johnson (1997) report bank debt
being concentrated among smaller U.S. ﬁrms, even though they use samples taken from pools of
large, publicly traded companies, so that their smaller ﬁrms are more “medium-sized.”
We also assume that bond investors have to pay lower monitoring costs than banks once a ﬁrm
defaults. In the event that a ﬁrm defaults, the larger issuance cost allows investors to recoup their
investment with lower monitoring costs than would occur with bank loans.4 The small ﬁxed costs
incurred when using bank loans means the ﬁrm remains less transparent to lenders, so that banks
must incur additional monitoring costs to recover their funds in the event that a borrower defaults.
Is this assumption reasonable? The higher bank monitoring cost translates into higher interest
rates charged by banks than are paid on bonds. Indeed, this is true on average. Though yields may
be higher or lower than the prime rate at any given time, since 1949 the yield for Moody’s seasoned
Aaa bonds has been an average of 16 basis points higher than the bank prime rate.5 Further, in
the survey by Leal and Carvalho-da Silva (2006), zero respondents cited high interest rates as an
impediment to bond ﬁnancing, while 90% cited high interest rates as an impediment to borrowing
from domestic banks and 33% cited them as problematic when borrowing from foreign banks.
Though there is no comparable question regarding monitoring for bond issues, 13% of respondents
reported that monitoring by banks was a problem when using domestic bank loans and 17% when
using foreign bank loans. Thus, it is quite plausible that interest rates are higher for bank loans
than bond issues, even among the largest, least risky borrowers—especially those with no agency
credit ratings, given the results in Hale and Santos (2008)—and that monitoring costs are likely
4For the sake of simplicity—and without loss of generality—we presume the monitoring cost for ﬁrms defaulting
on bond issues is zero, though it can still be positive for our results to hold. It need only be lower than the monitoring
cost for bank loans in default, in accordance with the appellation “unmonitored” lending, which is often applied to
bond markets.
5Moody’s Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond Yield minus the Bank Prime Loan Rate, Federal Reserve Board of
Governors Release H.15 Selected Interest Rates (1/1/1949–7/1/2009, monthly), downloaded from the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis FRED database.
5generating part of that spread.
Most importantly, the results on bank versus bond market development and ﬁrm size are con-
sistent with more general results regarding ﬁnancial development. A number of studies using
ﬁrm-level data6 show that ﬁnancial underdevelopment disproportionately impacts access to credit
for small- and medium-sized ﬁrms. Most recently, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine
(2008) discover that small-size ﬁrms are more prevalent in the manufacturing output of countries
with higher levels of ﬁnancial development. Presenting new empirical support, they argue that
ﬁnancial development increases access to credit for small ﬁrms and expands credit for ﬁrms that
already have access: ﬁnancial development increases the supply of credit on both the extensive and
the intensive margin. We can capture this result. We show that for both margins to expand at once,
there must be improvements in bank eﬃciency which we model here as reduced monitoring costs,
though the increase in bank eﬃciency could be due to be any type of technological improvement or
subsidy in the banking sector or strengthening of the legal structure that reduces spreads between
bank lending and deposit rates.
In the interests of tractability, we assume that the risk of default is the same for bond issuers and
bank borrowers and is not correlated with ﬁrm size. This nontrivial simpliﬁcation is not directly
contradicted by the data, but has at best weak support. (Altman and Suggitt, 2000) show that the
marginal default rate for syndicated loans versus bond issues are very similar in the ﬁrst three years
and almost identical at three- to ﬁve-year horizons. It is diﬃcult to assess precisely what the default
rate is on the universe of non-syndicated commercial bank loans.7 However, data on default by
small businesses requiring government loan guarantees (presumably the most speculative of small
business ventures) show rates of loan default that are almost identical to those of (large) public debt
issuers rated “speculative” (Glennon and Nigro, 2005). Thus, although the default rate may well
be correlated with ﬁrm size, it is not immediately clear that the default rates diﬀer for public bond
issues versus bank loans conditional on ﬁrm size. All previous theoretical studies discussed below
assume or obtain a result where the default rate is lower for bond issuers than bank borrowers,
which ends up being observationally equivalent in our model to the assumption that monitoring
6See Benfratello, Schiantarelli, and Sembenelli (2008) (in particular, their fantastic footnotes 1–3) and Beck,
Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine (2008) for surveys.
7We can not use the plentiful data on nonperforming loan ratios, as these are akin to stock variables, while the
default rate is a ﬂow variable. Estimates of the default rate tend to be much lower than the gross ﬁrm exit rate,
which is measured precisely for the U.S., so the exit rate is not an appropriate proxy, either.
6costs are lower for bond issuers. Further, the assumption of an exogenous exit shock uncorrelated
with ﬁrm size is a helpful convention in seminal studies focusing on ﬁrm heterogeneity such as
Melitz (2003) and Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and we apply it to the default rate in this spirit.
1.2 Theoretical literature on ﬁnancial choice
A deep and venerable literature models the choice between ﬁnancial instruments. To model the
marginal cost of ﬁnancing, we use the costly state veriﬁcation used to overcome information asym-
metry in Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001), which is drawn from the work of Townsend (1979). In the
Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) framework, ﬁrms must borrow some proportion of their working capi-
tal from ﬁnancial intermediaries. The precise amount depends on their net worth carried over from
previous periods, so the dynamic component is quite important. The default rate in their setup is
endogenous, a function of the information asymmetry, but in their model and ours, all ﬁrms have
the same probability of default ex ante. Idiosyncratic productivity shocks that lead to defaults
strike each ﬁrm, with all shocks drawn from an identical distribution. Intermediaries must monitor
ﬁrms that default to verify their productivity draw and recover remaining assets. We abstract from
dynamics as much as possible to focus on intra-ﬁrm reallocation as a channel for ﬁnancial market
development to aﬀect aggregate outcomes. We also assume that ﬁrms are heterogeneous in their
eﬃciency levels ex ante and are struck not by a range of productivity shocks, but by a uniformly
distributed exit shock. The exit shock prevents the ﬁrm from producing, so the intermediary that
lent it capital at the beginning of the period can only recoup the capital itself, minus any monitor-
ing costs and without any accrued interest. We also introduce a ﬁxed cost into the loan contract,
which is added to the value of the loan principal or bond issue and paid (with interest if a ﬁrm
does not default) after production and sales take place. Thus, the ﬁxed cost aﬀects the decision to
borrow, but not the marginal cost of capital.
The setup diﬀers from Diamond (1991) who assumes that ﬁrms diﬀer in their probability of
default ex ante. In Diamond (1991), the choice between bank and bond ﬁnancing is a process of
sorting good from bad ﬁrms, or verifying the behavior of unreliable middle-ranked ﬁrms who might
choose good or bad projects. The best ﬁrms are able to develop a reputation for credit worthiness
that qualiﬁes them for unmonitored lending through bond issues. We assume that there is no
diﬀerence between the potential for bond issuers and bank borrowers to default. However, the time
7it takes to develop a strong reputation could be considered a large ﬁxed cost and our results all hold
even if bond issuers do have a lower incidence of default, as that reduces the bond yield relative to
the interest rate on bank loans. Our key assumptions therefore are generally complementary with
the underlying mechanisms in the Diamond (1991) model, even though we do not involve dynamic
reputation eﬀects and do not presume diﬀerent default rates across borrowers.
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and Repullo and Suarez (1998, 2000) assume that ﬁrms are het-
erogeneous in their initial endowment of assets when deciding between monitored and unmonitored
sources of ﬁnance. Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) focus on the macroeconomic eﬀects of exogenous
shocks to entrepreneurial or bank capital, similar to Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), while Repullo and
Suarez (2000) analyze the impact of exogenous shocks to the market interest rate due to changes in
monetary policy. Both Holmstrom and Tirole and Repullo and Suarez produce the general result
that the ﬁrms with the greatest net worth use direct (bond) ﬁnance, while ﬁrms with lesser net
worth use banks and those with the lowest net worth can not secure external ﬁnancing at all.8 We
assume that all cash ﬂows are rebated to the consumer as dividends at the end of each period, so
ﬁrms do not use retained earnings to ﬁnance their working capital as in these models (or, indeed,
as in Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001)). Financing investment with retained earnings is an interesting
and realistic feature of the dynamic behavior of ﬁrms responding to ﬂuctuations in macroeconomic
conditions. However, we elect to focus on the allocation of production across heterogeneous ﬁrms
in steady state. In a steady-state equilibrium, it is reasonable to imagine ﬁrms being required to
remit almost all proﬁts to shareholders, rather than sitting on stores of cash. Nonetheless, in our
model the most technologically eﬃcient ﬁrms also end up with the highest net worth in each period
and use bond issues to ﬁnance their capital, while less eﬃcient ﬁrms have a lower net worth and
use bank loans, with the least eﬃcient ﬁrms not producing at all. So these general results are
consistent with past work, even while we focus on intra-industry reallocation across steady states
rather than dynamic responses to aggregate shocks. We also innovate by endogenizing the size of
capital investment and let it vary by ﬁrm and by the marginal cost of ﬁnancing, so the presence of
ﬁnancial choice increases dispersion in ﬁrm size.
The models closest to ours look at diﬀerent types of ﬁnancial choice in general equilibrium
8Firms with lower net worth require monitoring because they have a higher probability of default. Firms with
the lowest net worth have such a high probability of default that the cost of necessary monitoring outweighs the
potential payoﬀs from production.
8that encompass the general properties of monitored versus unmonitored lending. De Fiore and
Uhlig (2005) examine the substitution between bank lending and trade credit, where trade credit
forces the liquidation of the entire ﬁrm in the event of default, while bank borrowing involves only
monitoring. Firms are heterogeneous due to an idiosyncratic productivity shock at the beginning
of the period. Their goal is to explain the prevalence of bank ﬁnancing in Europe relative to the
U.S. We use a simpliﬁed stochastic framework and employ ﬁxed costs of ﬁnancing to analyze the
implications of policies that favor the development of a particular ﬁnancial market for distribution
of output across heterogeneous ﬁrms and the resulting aggregate eﬀects. In this sense, our setup is
more similar to Ghironi and Lewis (2008), who analyze heterogeneous ﬁrms’ choice of whether to
become publicly listed on a stock exchange. Listing invites the monitoring of stockholders. Their
model actually allows this ﬁnancing choice to aﬀect the eﬃciency of ﬁrm managers, who become
more eﬃcient under the scrutiny of equity investors. We stay rooted in the more basic costly state-
veriﬁcation from Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001), where monitoring costs aﬀect payoﬀs to lenders, but
not ﬁrm governance.
Section 2 describes the model of ﬁrms and intermediaries. Section 3 discusses the calibration.
Section 4 solves the model and shows the macroeconomic eﬀects of banking sector and bond market
development through the channel of ﬁrm-level ﬁnancing decisions. Section 5 concludes and oﬀers
ideas for future research.
2 Studying the interaction between ﬁnancial structure and real
activity
In this section, we build a closed economy model of banks, bonds, and heterogeneous ﬁrms. Do-
mestic households consume and provide labor and capital to ﬁrms. They also own all domestic
ﬁrms and receive proﬁts from these ﬁrms. The ﬁnal goods sector is competitive and aggregates
imperfectly substitutable intermediate goods to produce ﬁnal goods. Intermediate goods produc-
ers hire labor and rent capital from households through ﬁnancial intermediaries. Depending on
whether they issue domestic public debt or take out loans from banks, they will pay diﬀerent ﬁxed
and marginal costs. Intermediate goods producers use identical technologies and only diﬀer in their
level of idiosyncratic eﬃciency when transforming labor and capital into varieties of the intermedi-
9ate good. Financial intermediaries channel savings from households to domestic ﬁrms. As discussed
above, banks charge a low ﬁxed cost to set up a ﬁnancial contract but must monitor more closely
ﬁrms that default and thus charge a high markup over their cost of funds to cover the monitoring
costs. Firms that issue public bonds pay a large ﬁxed fee to reveal information that reduces the
monitoring costs involved for bond investors. We make standard assumptions regarding the distri-
bution of idiosyncratic eﬃciency levels across ﬁrms that allow us to aggregate factor demands and
an endogenous split between the behavior of bank borrowers and public bond issuers.
2.1 Households
The representative domestic household maximizes discounted lifetime utility with respect to con-



















Lt is the amount of labor supplied and Ct represents aggregate consumption of a homogeneous ﬁnal
good. The instantaneous utility function (2.1) is of the form suggested by Greenwood, Hercowitz,
and Huﬀman (1988) (GHH). It eliminates the wealth eﬀect on the labor supply so that it directly
depends only on the wage rate and not on the level of consumption or the interest rate.
The consumer maximizes lifetime utility subject to the budget constraint:
PtYt = PtCt + PtKS
t+1 = wtLt + rtPtKS
t + PtKS
t (1 − γ) + πI
t + πF
t (2.2)
where wt is the wage rate, rt is the rental rate, KS
t is the capital (savings) supplied by the household
to ﬁrms through ﬁnancial intermediaries, πI
t and πF
t are dividends paid by ﬁnancial intermediaries
and ﬁrms to households. Capital depreciates at rate γ.9 Given the GHH preferences, the ﬁrst order
9We note that the capital accumulation equation, It = Kt+1−(1−γ)Kt, yields an equivalent form for the budget














The ﬁrst order condition with respect to aggregate consumption, Ct, equates the Lagrange mul-










The ﬁrst order condition with respect to capital is given by
λtPt = βλt+1Pt+1 (rt+1 + 1 − γ). (2.5)
















−θ = 1 + rt+1 − γ. (2.6)
This expression equates the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (on the left hand side) with
the gross return to capital after accounting for depreciation (on the right hand side).
Implicit in this expression is the assumption that capital goods can be transformed one-for-one
from the aggregated consumption bundle.
2.2 Final goods producers
The time subscripts above are necessary to address the consumer’s intertemporal reallocation that
results in savings. For simplicity, we drop the time subscripts in our discussion of ﬁrms here. A
perfectly competitive industry produces Y , a ﬁnal good used for consumption and investment in
the capital stock, by assembling a continuum of diﬀerentiated intermediate goods on the interval










For simplicity, we assume that this assembly process requires only the intermediate goods—no
additional labor or capital. Diﬀerent varieties i of each intermediate good, y(i), have an associated




















which is downward sloping in its price, p(i).
2.3 Intermediate goods producers
A mass of ﬁrms intermediate goods make production and ﬁnancing decisions to maximize proﬁts.
Each ﬁrm producing intermediate goods hires labor and borrows to purchase capital at the begin-
ning of the period to manufacture its unique variety. Each ﬁrm must also decide whether to ﬁnance
its capital expenditures by obtaining bank loans or issuing public bonds. As we discuss later, each
type of ﬁnancial contract entail a ﬁxed cost and a marginal cost: the interest rate rj and the ﬁxed
cost fj. The ﬁxed costs for issuing public bonds fb is greater than the ﬁxed cost to obtain a bank
loan, fl. The marginal cost of bond credit, rb is lower than the marginal cost of a bank loan, rl.
All workers in the economy receive the same wage rate, w. Firms take as given the wage rage, w,
the interest rate paid on borrowed capital, rj, and the ﬁxed costs of ﬁnancial contracts, fj.
12Each ﬁrm produces its unique variety of the intermediate good using the technology
yj(ϕ) = ϕLj(ϕ)αKj(ϕ)1−α,
where ϕ is a ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬃciency parameter, A is a country-speciﬁc eﬃciency parameter, L(ϕ)
and K(ϕ) represent the amount of labor and capital used, and α is the share of labor in variable
production costs, and the subscript j denotes what type of ﬁnancing the ﬁrm uses: bank loans (l)























where rj is the ﬁrm speciﬁc cost of capital and w is the competitive wage rate paid to labor.
2.4 Marginal costs and pricing







We will show below that ﬁrms obtaining credit by issuing bonds pay an interest rate, rb, that is
lower than the interest rate for ﬁrms obtaining credit that obtain bank loans, rl. Given this feature










A ﬁrm with an eﬃciency parameter ϕ facing ﬁxed ﬁnancial costs fj sets prices in order to
maximize proﬁt,
πj(ϕ) = pj(ϕ)yj(ϕ) −
Wj
ϕ
yj(ϕ) − (1 + rj)Pfj.
The ﬁxed ﬁnancial costs, denominated units of the ﬁnal good, and the rental rate on capital depend
on the choice of ﬁnancial instrument that the ﬁrm chooses to use.
13To simplify the intermediary’s problem, described below, we assume that ﬁxed costs are added
into the loan principal or the total amount of the bond issue and paid with interest after sales
take place. The ﬁxed cost for bond issuers represents the cost of auditing and underwriting by
investment banks, as well as extra reporting necessary to comply with regulatory oversight.10 For
bank borrowers, the ﬁxed cost involves closing costs or other fees involved with administrating the
loan application. We discuss the relative size of these costs and the impact that the choice of
ﬁnancing has on the rental rate of capital for particular ﬁrms below.
The ﬁrm takes as given market demand for its own variety, equation (2.8). The proﬁt maxi-








As in Melitz (2003), more eﬃcient (higher ϕ) ﬁrms charge lower prices. The downward-sloping
demand curves imply that ﬁrms charging lower prices produce more and have higher revenues.
Given the expression for prices, equation (2.9), we can write an expression for proﬁts as a








PY − (1 + rj)Pfj
Proﬁts are a positive function of revenues. For a given ﬁxed cost, more productive ﬁrms are also
more proﬁtable relative to other ﬁrms within the industry.
It is immediately clear that ﬁrms using loans, which have higher marginal costs, charge higher
prices, passing their higher marginal costs onto customers, than they would charge if they had
issued public debt. That is,
pl(ϕ) > pb(ϕ).
Since demand and revenues are falling in a variety’s price, it follows that sales and variable proﬁts
are lower for ﬁrms using bank credit.
10In fact, some portion of the ﬁxed costs of bond issuance are often absorbed in the total amount of capital raised
during the underwriting process as part of the “gross fee” when underwriters purchase bonds from the issuer and sell
them at a higher price to investors.
142.5 Credit markets
Whereas labor wages can be paid at the end of the period when sales occur, ﬁrms must borrow
funds to pay for capital in advance of production. We posit that ﬁrms must pay a large ﬁxed cost
to issue bonds, fb, paying an interest rate rb. To avoid these fees, ﬁrms can take out a loan from
a bank, paying only a small ﬁxed cost, fl < fb, but a higher interest rate, rl > rb. We use the
mnemonic index l to denote variables pertaining to ﬁnancing through bank loans and the index b
for variables pertaining to ﬁnancing through publicly issued bonds.
There are two reasons that banks could charge a higher interest rate. The ﬁrst is that the
banking sector is not perfectly competitive, so that rl includes a markup over the deposit rate, which
is the cost of funds for banks. This can occur in the absence of any uncertainty or information
asymmetries on the part of lenders. The second involves information uncertainties and would arise
as a result of an optimal contract. In this case, there is some uncertainty involving ﬁrm-speciﬁc
productivity shocks. The high ﬁxed cost involved in issuing bonds would make the actualization of
this shock transparent to lenders, so there is no risk of strategic default on the part of the ﬁrm. A
bank instead monitors the borrowing ﬁrm itself, adding the cost of this monitoring to the rate of
interest it charges the borrower. Either way, we have a wedge between the bank lending rate and
the deposit rate or bond yield.
Both the marginal cost of ﬁnancing and the choice of credit instrument is endogenous in this




πb(ϕ) = pb(ϕ)yb(ϕ) −
Wb
Aϕ
yb(ϕ) − (1 + rb)Pfb
πl(ϕ) = pl(ϕ)yl(ϕ) −
Wl
Aϕ
yl(ϕ) − (1 + rl)Pfl.
Using the intermediate goods demand function (2.8), proﬁts for ﬁrms issuing bonds, πb, can be
reduced to a function of revenues, the ﬁxed cost, and the elasticity of substitution. Both of these




































l PY ϕσ−2 > 0.














Due to the monitoring cost, this ratio is greater than one: the proﬁt function for bond issuers
increases more rapidly in ϕ than the proﬁt function for bank borrowers.
To assess the ﬁrm’s decision between the two sources of ﬁnancing, we ﬁnd two critical ﬁrm
eﬃciency levels, one where a ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between not producing and producing using loan
ﬁnancing, ϕl, and a second where a ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between producing using loan ﬁnancing and
bond ﬁnancing, ϕb. To obtain the eﬃciency level of the least eﬃcient active ﬁrm, ϕl, we use use
the zero proﬁt condition for ﬁrms that ﬁnance using loans, solving the equation
πl(ϕl) ≡ 0.















To obtain the eﬃciency level of the marginal ﬁrm that is indiﬀerent between issuing bonds and
obtaining bank loans, ϕb, we set the proﬁt earned using bank ﬁnancing equal to proﬁt earned using
bond ﬁnancing (πb(ϕb) = πl(ϕb)) and obtain:
ϕσ−1
b =















 (for rb 6= rl) (2.11)
16This threshold level is not identiﬁed for rb = rl, in which case all ﬁrms would simply choose the
type of ﬁnancing with the lowest ﬁxed cost (i.e., bank loans).
We can now derive the condition that guarantees that bond issuers are larger than bank bor-
rowers, ϕb > ϕl, matching the empirical ﬁndings in the ﬁnance literature. Since we use a zero
proﬁt condition to ﬁnd ϕl, we require that proﬁt be positive at the eﬃciency level where ﬁrms are
indiﬀerent between turning to banks and bonds. Substituting ϕσ−1














































− (1 + rl)fl
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,
which is greater than zero whenever the ﬁxed cost of bond issuance is suﬃciently large. The










Thus, the bond issuers will always be larger and more eﬃcient than bank borrowers when the
issuance fee is large relative to the costs of bank intermediation, as shown in Figure 1.
Default and ﬁrm death
We now consider the ﬁrm’s cost of capital, rj (for j ∈ b,l). There is a uniform probability, 0 < δ < 1,
that a ﬁrm will be hit by an exogenous “death” shock: it’s revenues will be zero and the ﬁrm will
exit without producing. The death shock could arise from an extreme taste shock or some calamity
of management exogenous to the model. We model it in such a stark form, in the manner of
Melitz (2003) and Ghironi and Melitz (2005), for simplicity. Lenders must audit defaulting ﬁrms
to verify that they actually received an adverse shock and then appropriately liquidate remaining
assets, which involves a monitoring cost. Lenders can recover any borrowed capital from exitors,
less monitoring cost and with no interest.
17Figure 1: Proﬁt functions and productivity thresholds diﬀer for bank borrowers and bond issuers
Banks must pay an interest rate on deposits used to make loans. In a world with perfectly
integrated ﬁnancial markets, this deposit rate equals the rate of return that investors could earn
in the bond market. That is, underwriters11 must price the bonds such that the eﬀective yield for
bond investors equals the interest rate paid on bank deposits. In equilibrium, both the yield for
bond investors and the interest rate on deposits equal the equilibrium market interest rate derived
from the consumer’s ﬁrst-order condition, equation (2.6), which in steady-state is given by
r =
1 − β + γ
β
. (2.13)
Suppose that nj ≤ n ﬁrms use intermediation of type j (j ∈ l,b) to ﬁnance their capital investments.
We assume that intermediaries are perfectly competitive, so the expected cost of raising funds and
11Note that underwriters are the intermediaries in the bond market.
18monitoring nonperforming assets must equal the expected gains from extending credit to successful
ﬁrms who repay all debts with no monitoring,
δnjµj[Kj(¯ ϕj) + fj] = (1 − δ)nj(rj − r)[Kj(¯ ϕj) + fj],
where Kj(¯ ϕj) is the average size of loans or bonds issued by intermediaries of type j, µj is the
monitoring cost (0<µj < 1), γ is the rate of depreciation on capital purchased with the loan, (1−γ)
is the portion of capital expenditures recoverable by the bank during liquidation, and rl − r is the
net return on earned interest revenues after paying interest on bank deposits.12 Then we have the
interest rate paid on ﬁnanced capital as a function of the market interest rate earned on deposits








In accordance with empirical ﬁndings by Hale and Santos (2008), we suppose that the large
ﬁxed cost a ﬁrm pays to conduct a viable bond issue makes its operations more transparent to
investors—in other words, bond investors incur a smaller monitoring cost than banks to liquidate
remaining assets of the ﬁrm (and recover their investment) upon exit. Without loss of generality,
we assume that the monitoring cost for bond investors equals zero (µl = µ, µb ≡ 0, with 0 < µ < 1),
though it need only be less than the monitoring cost for bank lenders for our results to hold. Note
that this implies an interest rate for bank loans, rl = r
1−δ +
δµ
1−δ and that underwriters purchase





1−δ, between the bank interest rate and the yield that ﬁrms must pay on
bond issues, we have rl > rb. This makes the marginal costs of capital lower for bond issuers than
for bank borrowers, implying that the proﬁt for bond issuers increases faster in their eﬃciency level
than that of bank borrowers: the right-hand side of equation (2.10) is greater than one.
Figure 1 illustrates how the wedge between the interest rates causes the less productive ﬁrms
to be bank borrowers and the most productive to be bond issuers. Since the rate of return paid
to bondholders and bank depositors is equal, the proportion of savings devoted to bond purchases
12This condition also holds on a loan-by-loan basis, so it makes no diﬀerence whether we formulate it for all loans,
nj[Kj(¯ ϕ) + fj], or for each loan, Kj(ϕ) + fj.
19versus bank deposits is determined entirely by the amount of bonds issued and bank loans demanded
by ﬁrms.
2.6 Aggregation
We assume that each ﬁrm draws its idiosyncratic productivity parameter from the cumulative
distribution H(ϕ). Denote the mass of ﬁrms using bank loans and bond issues to ﬁnance cap-
ital investment as nl and nb, respectively. Let n equal the total number of entrants in the in-
termediate goods sector (including ﬁrms who must immediately exit upon observing that they
have a productivity level less than ϕl). Then, nl = Prob(loan) × n = [H(ϕb) − H(ϕl)]n and
nb = Prob(bond) × n = [1 − H(ϕb)]n.
The segmentation between bank and bond ﬁnancers allows us to reduce the aggregate price


























































is the average eﬃciency level—the harmonic mean of all ﬁrm eﬃciency parameters weighted by the
inﬂuence of their respective interest payments on their price-setting behavior. Here, the average eﬃ-










202.7 Deﬁning the size of the ﬁnancial sectors
If, we make the simple standard assumption that eﬃciency draws are Pareto distributed, so that
























Using the reduced deﬁnition of P above (2.15), it is straightforward to derive the relationship








l ¯ ϕ. (2.17)
Above, we showed that under reasonable assumptions, the least productive ﬁrms in the economy are
bank borrowers. The zero proﬁt equation tells us that anything which increases ﬁrm proﬁtability
for bank borrowers—a bigger market (Y ), a greater love of variety (lower σ), a lower interest rate
(rl), or a lower ﬁxed cost for loans (fl)—reduces the productivity threshold for bank borrowers,
allowing extra ﬁrms at the margin to operate in the economy.
Then, we use the fact that the marginal bond market participant is indiﬀerent between ﬁnancing
capital expenditures using bank loans or public debt, manifest in equation (2.11). Substituting the















































. We assume that the ﬁxed cost of bonds
is suﬃciently large that χ is always greater than one, implying that bond issuers are always more
eﬃcient than the most eﬃcient bank borrower, given in equation (2.12).
212.8 Aggregate factor input demand
We now turn to obtaining expressions for aggregate labor demand and supply, capital demand and
supply, and the wage rate. We assume that exitors can not hire labor. It is straightforward to show
that Ld
j = (1−δ)njL(¯ ϕj), meaning that total labor demanded by successful ﬁrms using bank loans,
for instance equals the labor demanded by the average ﬁrm using bank loans, times the number
of ﬁrms using bank loans. The aggregation of the capital stock and ﬁrm proﬁts for intermediate
goods producers also yields Kd
j = njKj(¯ ϕj) and Πj = (1 − δ)njπj(¯ ϕj).
Now turn to the aggregate demand for labor. First, recall that labor demand by a ﬁrm with




























= (1 − δ)[nlL(¯ ϕl) + nbL(¯ ϕb)]






























an inverse function of the real wage.































[(1 − δ)Y ]
ψ−1
(1−α)ψ . (2.19)
The aggregate demand for capital is the sum of each ﬁrm’s demand for capital, which is de-




= nlK(¯ ϕl) + nbK(¯ ϕb). (2.20)
The capital borrowed by exitors does not disappear upon exit, so we do not subtract it from the
total demand for capital as we did for total labor demand.
2.9 Free entry and aggregate stability
Every entrepreneur who decides to enter the market pays an entry fee, fe, denominated in units of
the ﬁnal good, for the right to draw a productivity parameter, ϕ. Some of these ﬁrms draw ϕ < ϕl
and exit immediately. In equilibrium, the expected value of entry, given the uncertainty that an

















= [H(ϕb) − H(ϕl)]πl (¯ ϕl) + [1 − H(ϕb)]πb(¯ ϕb).
In addition, given the uniform probability that a ﬁrm will experience forced exit in any period,
equilibrium requires the number of new entrants in each period that are suﬃciently productive to
survive equal the number of forced exitors. That is,
[1 − H(ϕl)]ne = δn.
23This aggregate stability condition implies that total fees paid by businesses to ﬁnd out their indi-





2.10 Solving for the closed-economy steady state equilibrium
To solve for the steady state equilibrium for the closed economy, we begin with the steady-state
version of the goods market clearing condition,
PY = PC + PI = PC + γPK.
Then the consumer’s budget constraint, equation (2.2), becomes
PY = wL + (1 + rb − γ)PK + ΠF + ΠI. (2.21)
To compute aggregate ﬁrm proﬁts, we note once more that total proﬁts earned by ﬁrms that use
ﬁnancing method j equals njπj(¯ ϕj). integrate proﬁt for each individual ﬁrm,





nlpl(¯ ϕl)1−σ + nbpb(¯ ϕb)1−σ





− P (nl(1 + rl)fl + nb(1 + rb)fb). (2.22)
We assume that ﬁxed costs are fees that intermediaries transmit directly back to consumers as
dividends without any impact on the labor market,13
ΠI = P [(1 − δ)nl(1 + rl)fl + (1 − δ)nb(1 + rb)fb + nefe]. (2.23)
The total value of expenditures, PY , is equal to the number of ﬁrms times average ﬁrm revenues,
13In reality, there is a market for this type of ﬁnancial service and the amount of labor skilled in providing such
services can be an important factor in the ﬁnancial development and growth of an economy. We leave this question
for future research.
24¯ ρ: PY = n¯ ρ. Then, noting that πj(ϕ) =
rj(ϕ)








¯ π + (1 − δ)nl
n (1 + rl)Pfl + (1 − δ)nb
n (1 + rb)Pfb
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¯ π ≡ Pfe
¯ π = (1 − β)δPfe.





(1 − β)δPfe + (1 − δ)nl





σ ((1 − β)δfe + [H(ϕb,t) − (1 − δ)H(ϕl,t)]fl + (1 − δ)[1 − H(ϕb,t)]fb)
. (2.24)
We combine equation (2.21) with equations (2.13), (2.14), (2.15), (2.8), (2.19), (2.20), (2.18),
(2.22), (2.23), and (2.24) to ﬁnd the equilibrium quantities {P,Y,L,Kl,Kb,w,rb,rl,ϕb,ϕl,n}. Solv-
ing the model, we can study the impact of changes in transactions costs and the bank monitoring
costs on sectoral reallocation, output, and welfare.
3 Calibration
Exact ﬁgures for the size of the bond issuance costs fb that are comparable across countries are
diﬃcult to ﬁnd. Table 1 shows available estimates for 10 diﬀerent countries. For Bangladesh,
India, Nepal, and Pakistan, the fees are dramatically understated in comparison to Brazil, Mexico,
and Chile because they omit the ratings fees and underwriting fees by investment banks, which are
included in the estimates for the Latin American countries and together constitute the lion’s share
of the cost of issuance (up to 95% in Brazil, for instance, according to Zervos (2004)). Commissions
and fees for bond issues, are conservatively estimated at 7.4% of the size of total issues for Pakistan
(Sophastienphong, Mu, and Saporito, 2008), compared to 0.7–1.3% in the United States (Ong and
Luengnaruemitchai, 2005). The ﬁxed costs involved in bank lending fl are considerably smaller
25than those involved in the issuance of securities: non-interest income for the average U.S. bank
is 1% of bank assets, with just over half of that earned as fees related to deposit transactions,
rather than lending (DeYoung and Rice, 2006). Thus, even in the U.S., the cost of initiating a
bond issue is likely to be about twice the size of the ﬁxed transactions costs involved in arranging
the typical commercial bank loan. In our experiments we consider two alternative values for the
bond issuance costs fb. As an upper bond, we set fb equal to 10 times the cost of obtaining a bank
loan fl (fb = 5,fl = 0.5), corresponding to the ratio of Pakistan’s reported issuance cost to US
bank lending fees. As a lower bound, we set fb equal to twice the costs of obtaining a bank loan
(fb = 1,fl = 0.5), approximating the ratio observed in the United States.
Table 2 shows evidence regarding the size of the other two ﬁnancial friction parameters, the
fraction of default of bank monitored loans (δ) and the cost of monitoring those loans (µ). Estimates
of the default rate δ for non-syndicated loans vary widely, from less than 1 percent in South Korea
to 6 percent in Portugal, to almost 12 percent for small businesses in the United States in 2008.
We choose a middle ground of 5 percent, δ = 0.05. The monitoring cost µ corresponds with the
sum of the administrative costs of recovery for defaulted assets and the fraction of the loan that
can not be recovered—termed loss given default within the Basel Standards. Estimates of direct
administrative costs incurred to recover of assets in U.S. bankruptcy courts are up to 10% of the
value of bankruptcy estates (Fisher and Martel, 2008). Estimates of loss given default again vary
widely by country and the type of ﬁrm, as well as the nature of a ﬁrm’s relationship with the
bank that loans it money, and macroeconomic conditions. We choose a range of values for µ in
our policy experiments. As an upper bond, we set the monitoring cost to be equal to 40% in the
range observed in Latin America (Dermine and de Carvalho, 2006). For the lower bound, we set
the monitoring costs to 10%, a ﬁgure between the lowest level observed in Portugal (8 percent) and
in the U.S. (13 percent).
We choose standard values for the remaining parameters. We set the elasticity of substitution
σ equal to 8, based on the range of estimates found in Feenstra (1994) and Broda and Weinstein
(2006), with the Pareto shape parameter, θ, set equal to σ in order to capture the degree of
dispersion in ﬁrm size seen in Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004). The cost share of labor in the
production function (α) is 0.65 and we set the elasticity of the labor supply ψ equal to 2. The
results are robust to a range of values for these parameters.
264 Results
4.1 Intra-industry reallocation of output
Table 3 shows the calibration of the key policy parameters: the bond issuance costs, the bank
loan access cost, and bank monitoring costs. The table also shows the resulting solutions for the
endogenous variables as we vary the level of the bond issuance cost parameter, fb, and the level of
the bank monitoring cost parameter, µ. Going from columns (2) to (1) and (4) to (3), the table
shows changes in the endogenous variables as the ﬁxed cost of bond issuance falls from 10 times
the size of the ﬁxed cost involved in securing bank credit (as for Pakistan, for instance) to a level
twice the size of the ﬁxed cost of bank credit (as for the United States). Comparing column (2)
to column (1), the table shows the eﬀects of lowering the bond issuance cost parameter fb for a
low level of monitoring cost (µ = 0.1). Comparing column (4) to column (3), the table shows the
eﬀects of lowering bond issuance costs when monitoring costs are “high,” with µ = 0.4.
Figures 2a and 2b show the level of output produced and proﬁt earned by ﬁrms with diﬀerent
levels of idiosyncratic eﬃciency, ϕ. Figure 2a reveals the intra-industry reallocation of production
induced by falling bond issuance costs. Mid-size ﬁrms, the ones switching from bank loans to bond
issues, expand and the largest and smallest ﬁrms—the non-switchers—contract a bit. The switchers
experience a drop in their marginal cost of capital ﬁnancing, which they pass on to the consumer
in the form of lower prices, boosting the demand for their products. The non-switchers lose market
share to the switchers and must pay higher labor costs, as the expansion of the switchers drives up
the real wage. The scale eﬀect for switchers is therefore a ﬁrst-order eﬀect of reducing fb, while the
scale eﬀect for non-switchers is smaller, a second-order eﬀect.
The intra-industry reallocation also involves a reduction on the extensive margin. Regardless of
the size of monitoring costs, as the bond issuance cost, fb, falls from 5 to 1 the threshold eﬃciency
level for active production, ϕl, rises. This means that the number of active ﬁrms fall as access
to bond markets gets easier. The smallest ﬁrms are pushed out, unable to turn a proﬁt amidst
higher labor costs and market shares squeezed by the expanding switchers. At the same time, the
threshold eﬃciency level for bond issuers, ϕb, falls. Thus, the number of bank borrowers falls due to
exit on the low end of the productivity spectrum and due to switching into bond issuance. Though
non-switchers shrink in size, the increase in aggregate output Y seen in Table 3, combined with the
27lower number of active ﬁrms, implies a net increase in the intensive margin for the average ﬁrm.
The contraction at the extensive margin also results in an increase in average productivity, ¯ ϕ. It is
plain to see that the sectoral reallocation is driven primarily by switching, rather than exit, as the
threshold eﬃciency level for bond issuance, ϕb, drops much more precipitously than the eﬃciency
level for the marginal bank borrower, ϕl, rises. In sum, we see production reallocated away from the
smallest and the largest ﬁrms, toward the mid-size switchers, whose aggregate expansion exceeds
the aggregated contraction of the non-switchers.14
To further understand the reasons behind the intra-industry reallocation following a drop in
the bond issuance costs, it is useful to consider the proﬁt functions of the bond issuers and the
bank borrowers seen in Figure 2b. A drop in bond issuance costs, by itself, immediately raises the
proﬁts for all bond borrowers as their ﬁxed costs are lower. This entices ﬁrms on the margin that
were not issuing bonds to start issuing (ϕb falls). As mentioned above, those ﬁrms experience a
large reduction in their marginal cost of capital, allowing them to drop prices for their products,
and to increase their output. The increase in the real wage drives up marginal costs for all ﬁrms,
particularly for those ﬁrms that do not switch their source of ﬁnancing, lowering their proﬁts. Thus,
the smallest and the largest ﬁrms that did not switch pass the increased labor costs on to consumers
in the form of higher prices, ultimately reducing their output and dampening proﬁts despite the
increase in aggregate consumption. We observe proﬁts reallocated away from the non-switchers at
either end of the eﬃciency spectrum toward the switchers in the middle.
Sectoral reallocation from a drop in bond issuance costs is most pronounced when the banking
sector is less eﬃcient (µ is “high”). As Figure 3 and Table 3 show, when monitoring costs are high
there is much greater growth of the bond market relative to bank loans, measured either as the ratio
of bond issuers to bank borrowers or as the total amount of bond issues relative to bank credit. In
Table 3, when bond issuance costs drop and bank monitoring costs are low (going from columns (2)
to (1)) the number of bank borrowers drops by 6 percent. When bank monitoring costs are high
(going from columns (4) to (3)) the number of bank borrowers drops by 33 percent—more than
ﬁve times as much turnover. Turnover among bank borrowers boosts average ﬁrm productivity
when the least eﬃcient ﬁrms exit and reduces prices through switching, generating larger increases
14The reallocation of production toward the middle of the eﬃciency spectrum also reduces reduces dispersion in
the distribution of ﬁrm size.
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Figure 2: Reallocation of output across ﬁrm eﬃciency levels when fb falls
29in aggregate consumption, output, and welfare compared to when monitoring costs are low. The
augmented impacts seen when the monitoring cost µ is high are related to the exit factor, rather
than switching. Roughly the same amount of switching, measured by the percent change in ϕb and
nb, occurs whether the monitoring costs are high or low, but the switching pushes up the real wage
more when monitoring costs are high because the switch from bank to bond ﬁnancing provides
an even bigger discount on marginal cost of capital and thus on the price of goods produced by
switchers. Thus, the real wage, which increases almost 5 times more as fb falls when monitoring
costs are high, drives the extra exit among the smallest bank borrowers.
Figure 3: The number of bond issuers relative to bank borrowers increases faster as issuance costs
fall when bank monitoring costs are high
A reduction in bank monitoring costs has qualitatively diﬀerent impacts on sectoral reallocation
than a reduction in bond issuance costs. In Table 3, we show results from a drop in bank monitoring
30costs µ when bond issuance costs fb are “low” (going from columns (3) to (1)) and when bond
issuance costs are “high” (going from columns (4) to (2)). Reducing bank monitoring costs reduces
the marginal costs of all bank borrowers, aﬀecting both the intensive and extensive margins. Along
the extensive margin, a reduction in borrowing costs for bank borrowers raises their proﬁtability.
Thus, low-productivity ﬁrms that previously lay dormant begin to produce (ϕl falls). Moreover,
some bond issuers now ﬁnd it optimal to switch to bank borrowing (ϕb rises). Those ﬁrms that
switch from issuing bonds to borrowing from banks enjoy lower ﬁxed costs, but experience an
increase in marginal costs, which compels them to increase their prices and face lower demand for
their output. All ﬁrms that already were borrowing from banks experience a drop in marginal costs
directly as a result of the drop in bank monitoring costs and they increase their output.
Aggregate output, labor demand and real wages seen in Table 3 increase when µ falls. As in the
case of lowering bond issuance costs, the second-order eﬀect on the real wage increases the marginal
costs of bond issuers that do not switch into bank borrowing. The incumbent bond issuers also
ﬁnd their market share redirected toward incumbent bank borrowers who pass lower ﬁnancing costs
on to consumers as lower goods prices. Thus, a reduction in bank monitoring costs causes entry
into production. It reallocates production away from mid-sized ﬁrms (and to a lesser extent, away
from the largest ﬁrms) toward the smallest ﬁrms, including new entrants. At the same time, it
reallocates proﬁts away from the largest ﬁrms toward both mid-size and small ﬁrms. The mid-size
ﬁrms that beneﬁt here—in contrast to the case of reduced costs of bond issuance—are not just
ﬁrms that switch their source of ﬁnancing in order to take advantage of the falling bank interest
rates. They include the smallest switchers, for whom the reduced ﬁxed costs from switching into
bank loans outweigh the increased marginal costs of bank ﬁnancing and higher real wages, as well
as the largest incumbent bank borrowers, for whom reduced ﬁnancing costs outweigh higher real
wages. The impact on the real wage, aggregate output, and welfare is bigger when the ﬁxed cost
of bond issuance is high because there are more and larger incumbent bank borrowers beneﬁtting
from the lower bank ﬁnancing costs and responding by lowering their prices.
There is a suggestion in the literature on ﬁnancial development (see the brief survey in Beck,
Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine (2008)) that since mainly large ﬁrms issue public debt and
because debt issuance involves large ﬁxed transactions costs, bond market development probably
favors large large ﬁrms over smaller ﬁrms. Figure 2 shows that in the stylized setting of our model,
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Figure 4: Reallocation of output across ﬁrm eﬃciency levels when bank monitoring cost µ falls
32the eﬀects are somewhat nuanced. On the one hand, small ﬁrms are pushed out, as noted above,
and the remaining bank borrowers (all at the lower end of the ﬁrm size distribution) see a decrease
in output. On the other hand, the largest ﬁrms, incumbent bond issuers, also see a small reduction
in output. What is striking is that it is the medium-sized ﬁrms that switch from bank-borrowing
to bond issuance that experience a large increase in output. We qualify this as “large” because,
as Table 4 shows, the increase in output by these switching ﬁrms must overweight the reduction
in output from the ﬁrms that do not switch and the ﬁrms that exit, as the overall output of the
economy grows.
4.2 Financial market development, intra-industry reallocation and welfare
In our model, reducing the ﬁxed cost of bond issuance results in an increase in welfare, consumption,
the real wage, and the capital stock, as does reducing the monitoring cost. As we saw in the previous
subsection, a drop in bond issuance costs reduces the number of active ﬁrms. However, the shrinking
number of ﬁrms occurs simultaneously with an increase in the capital stock, employment, the wage
(both the nominal and the real wage), the capital-to-labor ratio, and consumption, as the number
of ﬁrms in the bond-issuing sector increases. The overall capital stock increases, as does the capital-
to-labor ratio for the economy as a whole.
Figure 5a shows the level of welfare and output for diﬀerent levels of bond issuance costs, fb.
Lower levels of bond issuance costs are associated with higher bond market development, measured
as the stock of total issues. Each line maps the level of welfare attained at various levels of bond
issuance costs, given a particular monitoring cost µ. Lower levels of µ are associated with a higher
level of banking sector development, measured by the total stock of bank loans.
Welfare improves as bond issuance costs fall, regardless of the level of the bank monitoring costs.
Note that the welfare beneﬁts of lowering the bond issuance cost accelerates as the issuance cost
gets smaller. This is because progressively more ﬁrms are able to issue bonds for each incremental
reduction of fb when the marginal issuer springs from further and further down the spectrum of
eﬃciency levels (Figure 3).15 So, it is welfare-improving for a country to develop its bond mar-
15That is, the hazard rate for the Pareto distribution,
θ
ϕ, increases as we move down the hierarchy of eﬃciency
levels. Thus, the size but not the direction of welfare impacts from bond market development is sensitive to the
Pareto shape parameter governing the distribution of eﬃciency levels. The elasticity of substitution has a similar
impact, as it inﬂuences the distribution of ﬁrm size and therefore the rate of switching.
33(a) Welfare
(b) Aggregate Output
Figure 5: Impacts of Bank v. Bond Market Development on Welfare and Output
34ket using policies that reduce issuance costs and there are increasing returns to each incremental
reduction.
Regardless of the actual size of the issuance cost, the aggregate eﬀects of lowering bond issuance
costs depend on the relative eﬃciency of the bank sector. The impact of bond market development
is much bigger when the banking sector is less eﬃcient—when monitoring costs are large. Higher
monitoring costs drive up the cost of ﬁnancing for bank borrowers so that access to cheaper bond
ﬁnancing packs a bigger punch in lowering the unit cost of production and thus the aggregate price
level. In the model, subsidizing bank credit is observationally equivalent to lowering monitoring
costs. A country that subsidizes bank loans naturally will ﬁnd it harder to increase the relative
importance of its bond market by reducing issuance costs. This is evident in Table 3, as the level
of bank credit declines less and the ratio of bond issues to bank credit grows less as fb falls when
the monitoring cost µ is low.
5 Conclusions
We have drawn on stylized facts from the empirical ﬁnance literature regarding ﬁrm size and the
choice between bank credit and bond issues to build a general equilibrium model that allows us to
analyze the macroeconomic eﬀects of ﬁnancial policies targeted at particular credit markets. The
reallocation of production across ﬁrms is quite diﬀerent when increasing the eﬃciency of the banking
sector as opposed to reducing issuance costs to increase access to the bond market. Increasing bank
eﬃciency by reducing monitoring costs reallocates production toward the smallest ﬁrms and even
allows very small new ﬁrms to start producing. The expansion and price cuts among incumbent
bank borrowers, as well as additional labor demand among new entrants, drives up the real wage.
It also induces some mid-size ﬁrms to switch from bond issues to bank borrowing, increasing their
marginal costs and thus their prices, contracting demand for their individual goods relative to those
of non-switchers. Production by the largest ﬁrms that continue issuing bonds drops a bit due to
increased real wages and lower prices among incumbent bank borrowers.
In contrast, reducing bond issuance costs boosts the size and proﬁtability of mid-size ﬁrms
that switch from bank borrowing to bond issuance, while forcing out the smallest ﬁrms at the low
end of the eﬃciency spectrum. The largest ﬁrms and the smallest surviving ﬁrms (non-switchers)
35experience a small drop in output. The end result is an increase in the real wage, consumption,
and welfare. Mid-size ﬁrms are the biggest “winners” from decreasing bond issuance costs, as large
incumbent issuers ﬁnd the surplus from reduced issuance fees eroded by increased labor costs. This
general equilibrium eﬀect is new to both macroeconomics and ﬁnance.
Whether one policy produces a greater welfare increase than another depends on the relative
size of transactions costs in the two credit markets. Welfare gains from increasing banking sector
eﬃciency are greatest when the ﬁxed costs of bond issuance are high, so that more ﬁrms—and larger
ﬁrms, on average—are dependent on bank credit even before the change and enjoy a reduction in
marginal costs when the interest rate on their loans falls. Welfare gains from reducing the cost
of bond issuance are largest when monitoring costs in the banking sector are very high for two
reasons. First, the switch to bond issues generates an even greater savings in the marginal cost
of capital, so the switching has a bigger impact on prices than in the case where monitoring costs
are low. As a second-order eﬀect, the bigger punch to prices provides an extra boost to the real
wage, causing more exit. The extra exit occurs at the bottom of the eﬃciency spectrum, increasing
aggregate productivity at the same time the switchers are enjoying big savings on their marginal
cost of capital ﬁnancing.
There are a number of ways to expand the model in future research. Among them, we model the
banking sector here as perfectly competitive. Modeling imperfect competition among banks using a
Salop-Hotelling approach would introduce an interdependence between the size of the banking sector
and the interest rate charged on bank loans. A similar feature could be modeled for underwriters in
the bond market. The transactions costs could become a function of both policy and competition
within and between ﬁnancial sectors. The model could be extended to incorporate bank reserves as
a mechanism for monetary policy, as in Bernanke and Blinder (1988, 1992). It could also contain
a limited participation dimension in the bond market to capture potential diﬀerences in the depth
of credit instruments in the banking sector versus the bond market. We have abstracted from any
correlation between the risk of default and ﬁrm size, as discussed above. However, the riskiness
of each ﬁrm could depend explicitly on its capital structure, which obviously varies across ﬁrms
in our framework and likely varies across the business cycle. To the degree that default rates and
monitoring costs vary with the business cycle, bank and bond spreads could be allowed to do so also.
Any of these additional mechanisms could impact ﬁrms’ choice of ﬁnancial instrument and intra-
36industry reallocation following changes in the structure of transactions costs in ﬁnancial markets.
Nonetheless, our key insight—that changes in transactions costs in a particular credit market
will impact the pattern of intra-industry reallocation and macroeconomic outcomes diﬀerently,
depending on the underlying level of ﬁnancial development and which market one targets—remains
unchallenged by such extensions.
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